ShopMy

ShopMy is creator affiliate infrastructure: links, storefronts, brand-creator matching and commission payouts across roughly 200,000 creators. It raised $70M in October 2025 at a $1.5B valuation, led by Avenir with Bain Capital Ventures and Bessemer, after $77.5M in January 2025 — around $175M total (Sacra, ContentGrip). It was profitable in 2024 and grew revenue 200% year on year.

It is in this atlas for a reason that has little to do with creators. ShopMy is the cleanest available demonstration of how far apart two "revenue" numbers for the same company can sit, and of what happens to a valuation judgement depending on which one you anchor to.

#The two numbers

Both are true. Only one is money ShopMy keeps. The marketing leads with the GMV figure; the round was underwritten on the net figure. GMV is roughly 12.5x net revenue here, and a reader who anchored on GMV would have computed 1.5x and concluded the company was cheap — a conclusion off by more than an order of magnitude. This is the mechanism GMV is not revenue exists to name.

To ShopMy's credit, the net number is disclosed. That is rarer than it should be: Later leads its releases with a $2.4B annual GMV run rate and $250M+ of cumulative creator payouts, and discloses no net revenue at all. The fooling in creator commerce generally happens downstream — in secondary markets and founder comparisons — rather than in the lead investor's model.

#The multiple, honestly

At 18.8x net revenue, ShopMy is priced above the public comparables for anything with a human-supply component — Appen trades at ~0.9x, Innodata at ~6.2x on 40% gross margins — but well below the aggressive software marks in the same register. It is not a GMV-flattered valuation. It is a rational-if-rich price for a genuinely software-shaped business: the payouts flow through, ShopMy takes a fee, and there is no contractor cost line eating the top of the P&L the way there is in AI data. See What the public market pays for labour.

Compare with Whop, which is the same shape one rung down: $2.67B of cumulative GMV, $142M annualised net, a $1.6B mark, ~11x net. Two companies, near-identical valuations, two very different net revenue bases, and both of them regularly described in press terms that make the comparison impossible.

#What it tells the operator

Three things.

A 3–8% take is compatible with a $1.5B valuation, but only with software economics attached. ShopMy does not brief creators, does not QC output and does not take endorsement liability. It provides links and payouts. The moment an operator moves up into briefing and directing — the clipping and managed-UGC position described in Paid creators, clipping and UGC ad ops — the take goes up and so does everything else: The law is about to arrive exposure, FTC §255.1(f) endorsement liability, and the fraud surface in Who is actually on the other end.

Affiliate attribution is a harder-to-fake unit than views. ShopMy is paid on verified purchases. Clipping platforms are paid on view counts that Content Rewards' own founder says he cannot fully trust. That difference is most of the reason one of these models supports an 18.8x mark and the other supports a payments fee.

Consolidation is running toward the accountable layer, not the marketplace layer. Later bought Mavely for $250M in January 2025; Publicis bought Captiv8 in May 2025 after Influential; Accenture Song bought Whalar in mid-2026. ShopMy is one of the few in the set still independent and still raising rather than selling — which is what a company with disclosed net revenue and real gross margin gets to do. See Marketplace, staffing firm, BPO or agency.